The Roots of Goodness: The Fulfillment of Basic Human Needs and the Development of Caring, Helping and Non-aggression, Inclusive Caring, Moral Courage, Active Bystandership, and Altruism Born of Suffering

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Caring that develops can be limited to a particular group of people, to some "in-group." When the basic needs of whole groups of people are frustrated by difficult social conditions, such as economic problems, political upheaval, and great societal change, psychological and social processes can lead those group to turn against and victimize others (Staub, 1989a). If enough people in a group have developed inclusive caring (caring for the welfare of people who are not members of their group, ideally for all human beings) and moral courage (the courage to speak out and act according to one's values and beliefs in the face of potential or actual opposition, i.e., even if these beliefs and values are contrary to prevailing views in one's immediate environment or larger group), their active bystandership, their speaking out in behalf of their values and in behalf of the people who are harmed, can inhibit the evolution of increasing harmdoing and violence. I will note the importance of inclusive caring, moral courage, and positive bystandership both on the societal level and on the level of smaller groups groups—for example, children's peer groups, where they can inhibit bullying. I will also discuss the developmental roots of such processes and how they can be fostered.

and that lead them to promote others' welfare. One such belief is enlightened self-interest. While enlightened self-interest may seem the least moral of moral beliefs since the motivation is to create a world in which one will be helped in turn, it may be a core belief out of which much of morality develops. The motivation here arises from the existence, awareness, or knowledge of and belief in the human proclivity for reciprocity, including "generalized reciprocity" (for a discussion of this, see Staub, 1978). The latter is the notion that, if one helps another person, this person is not only more likely to help oneself in return but also more likely to help some other person in need. Thus, by helping others, one contributes to creating a world in which people in general will be helpful to oneself as well as to important people in one's life. The belief in enlightened self-interest can, and in the course of the evolution of morality in society is likely to, develop into the belief that one should help other people and that people ought to help each other. These, as well as justice and the sanctity of human lives, are among important moral beliefs.

I see motivation as moral when to some substantial degree its focus is to fulfill or live up to a moral belief, value, or principle. One limitation of such motivation is that its focus can become adherence to the norm or principle itself rather than the human welfare that it tries to protect or advance. It can, therefore, lead to distortions, such as justice not mitigated by mercy. Children may be punished to serve justice in ways that make them into less caring people. In the end, the purpose of the moral value or principle, to serve human welfare, is subverted, possibly both at the moment and in the long run. Another possible distortion is a primary focus on living up to one's view of oneself as a moral person rather than on the welfare of the people whom the moral principles aim to serve (Karylowski, 1976).

Altruistic motivation, the desire to benefit someone in need, to reduce a person's distress or enhance his or her well-being, is more directly focused on the person rather than on a belief or principle. It can arise from affective connections to a person or people that make empathy or sympathy possible and more likely. It can also arise from certain types of moral beliefs or values, such as a belief in one's responsibility for others' welfare. It probably often arises from some combination of the two.

Altruistic motivation is likely to have at least two related but not identical roots. One is affective: *empathy*, or the vicarious experience

of others' feelings. The kind of empathy that generates *sympathy* has been found especially important in motivating helpful action. Sympathy includes both feeling with and concern about a person (Batson, 1990; Eisenberg, 2002; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Hoffman, 1975a, 1975b; a feeling of sorrow or concern for the distressed or needy other [Eisenberg, 2002, p. 135]). In contrast *personal distress*—when someone's distress generates distress that is seemingly empathic but that is focused on the self (Batson, 1990; Eisenberg, 2002; Eisenberg et al., 1989)—gives rise to motivation to reduce one's own distress. It leads to helping when that is the best way to reduce one's own distress, but not when some other action, like leaving the situation, is a relatively easy way to reduce one's distress (see Eisenberg, in this volume).

Another form of altruistic motivation is what I have called *prosocial value orientation*. This orientation is related to helping people in either physical distress (Erkut, Jaquette, & Staub, 1981; Staub, 1974) or psychological distress (Feinberg, 1978; Grodman, 1979; Staub, 1978, 1980; see also Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer, & Speer, 1991; Shroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995). In these studies prosocial orientation was measured by a combination of existing measures that were factor analyzed, with the scores on a first, dominant factor used as indicators of prosocial orientation. For subsequent studies a measure of prosocial orientation that I developed was used (Staub, 1989b, 2003). Scores on this measure were related to self-reports of varied forms of helping (Staub, 1995, 2003). Prosocial orientation was also positively related to constructive patriotism, which combines love of country with the willingness to oppose policies that are contrary to humane values, and negatively related to blind patriotism, a tendency to be uncritical of one's country, to not consider whether its policies or practices are "right or wrong" (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999; Schatz & Staub, 1997; Staub, 1997).

As we measured it, the three primary aspects of a prosocial value orientation appear to be a positive view (i.e., a positive evaluation and, hence, valuing) of human beings, a concern for people's welfare, and a feeling of personal responsibility for others' welfare (see Feinberg, 1978; Grodman, 1979; Schatz et al., 1999; Staub, 1974, 1989b, 1995, 2003). Although a prosocial value orientation has been measured "cognitively," in a questionnaire, it appears to be an affective, sympathetic orientation to people combined with a conscious con-

cern about people's welfare and a belief in one's own responsibility for others' welfare. Empathy, and especially sympathy, embody concern for others, which presumably requires a positive evaluation of or orientation to human beings. A feeling of personal responsibility may, however, be an important additional motivational component, making action in behalf of people in need more likely.

When such personal characteristics as the holding of moral values or a prosocial orientation or a tendency to respond with empathy and sympathy are activated by circumstances such as others' need for help or distress, it is likely that they will give rise to motivation to help. As research with a prosocial value orientation indicates, and as one would expect, people inclined to respond with such altruistic motivation to others' needs are helpful under a wide range of conditions.

The literature on aggression also differentiates among motivations for harming others. The most prominent distinction has been between *hostile* aggression, motivated by the desire to harm, and *instrumental* aggression, which aims to gain benefits for oneself and uses aggression as a means to that end (Berkowitz, 1993). *Defensive aggression*, which aims to protect the self (from real or imagined harm)—a common form of aggression (Dodge, 1993; Toch, 1969)—may be differentiated from other forms of instrumental aggression. But, in this as well as in other kinds of aggression, hostile and instrumental motives frequently join (Staub, 1996b). Recently a distinction has been made between physical aggression, on the one hand, and relational aggression (such as excluding others, or spreading rumors about them, or harming their reputation in other ways), on the other. The former has been described as more characteristic of boys, the latter of girls (Crick, 1997).

One would expect that values and emotional orientations that give rise to moral or altruistic motivation for helping would also reduce aggression. This has been explored to a somewhat limited extent. Feshbach and Feshbach (1969), for example, found that very young children who were more empathic were not less aggressive but that somewhat older children who were more empathic were less aggressive. In a number of studies Eisenberg has found that children who respond to others' need with sympathy tend to be less aggressive (see Eisenberg, in this volume). Kohlberg and Candee (1984) found that adults who had higher responsibility subscores at various

stages of moral development were less likely to continue to obey the experimenter and administer electric shocks in a Milgram obedience study. Spielman and Staub (2000) found that seventh- and eighth-grade boys who were less aggressive, as measured by teacher ratings and in-school detentions, had higher prosocial value orientation scores (on an adolescent version of the measure).

In addition to characteristics directly relevant to the motivation to help, other characteristics are required to give rise to the motivation and lead to its expression in action. I have called these *supporting characteristics* (Staub, 1980). One of these is a feeling of efficacy (Midlarsky, 1971; Staub, 1980, 1995, 2003), which makes it likely that the motivation for helping is transformed into action and probably even that the motivation arises. Another is the capacity for role taking, for understanding how others' circumstances would affect them or how others actually feel (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Staub, 1979). This is especially important when the need for help is not obvious.

Basic Human Needs, Altruism, and Aggression

Varied psychological theories include assumptions about central psychological needs. Some theorists (Erikson, 1959; Maslow, 1968, 1987; Murray, 1938; and, more recently, Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1990; Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995; Staub, 1989a, 2003) have proposed the existence of universal human needs. If there are universal, basic, psychological needs, they must play a substantial role in human life. I have been suggesting that the frustration of basic needs is central in the development of hostility and aggression and that their fulfillment is central in the development of caring about other people's welfare and altruism (see Staub, 1989a, 1996b, 1999b, 2003).

The needs on which I have focused, which overlap with needs that others have proposed, are those for security, for a positive identity, for effectiveness and control, for a positive connection to other human beings, for autonomy, for a comprehension of reality, for life satisfaction, and for transcendence of the self (for definitions and detailed discussion, see esp. Staub, 2003). These needs are not seen as hierarchical. Possibly the need for security is more basic than the others, and the needs for life satisfaction and for transcendence (the need to go beyond the self, which can be satisfied by helping others or by connecting to nature or to spiritual entities) are more advanced, deriving

from and following the satisfaction of the other needs. However, apart from transcendence, all these needs are present at birth. And even at a very early age children are often in transcendent states, in which there is absorption in something beyond the self—seemingly an element or component of later transcendence (Staub, 2003).

Basic needs are powerful. They press for satisfaction. When they are not fulfilled in constructive ways in the course of normal experience, people will develop destructive modes of need satisfaction. *Destructive need satisfaction* means that a person fulfills one need in a way that frustrates his or her other needs (if not immediately, then in the long run) or that he or she fulfills needs in a way that frustrates other people's fulfillment of their basic needs.

For example, the need for effectiveness and control is the need to feel that one can influence events and, especially important, that one can protect oneself from harmful events and fulfill important goals. When this need is greatly frustrated, and especially when the frustration is the result of traumatic experience, the hallmark of which is lack of control over extremely stressful events that feel life threatening (Herman, 1992; Pearlman & Saakvitne, 1995; Staub, 2003, n.d.-b), then a child (or an adult) may attempt to exercise control over all events, including the behavior of other people. This leads to constant vigilance, or hypervigilance, which is stressful.

The excessive need for control limits the range of the individual's behavior and interferes with the development of his or her own self and, thereby, the satisfaction of his or her need for a positive identity. It will also frustrate the needs of other people whom the individual seeks to control (e.g., their need for effectiveness and autonomy) and evoke reactions that will frustrate the individual's need for positive connection to others. For example, a child may try to constantly direct the activities of friends, including the extent and nature of their relationships to other children. This makes the child less attentive to and less engaged with other things. It also negatively affects the friends, possibly even leading them to terminate the friendship.

Difficult, stressful conditions of life may frustrate the basic needs of whole groups of people, leading to destructive modes of need fulfillment. A group may scapegoat some other group, for example, a subgroup of society, blaming it for the difficulties of life. It may create an ideology (a vision of social arrangements) that is destructive, in that it identifies some people as enemies who must be de-

stroyed to fulfill the "positive" vision of the ideology. These psychological/social practices may help fulfill basic needs by making members of the group feel that they are not at fault for life problems, by giving them a feeling of effectiveness in working to fulfill the ideology, by creating connection among those who scapegoat or are part of an ideological movement. But they fulfill basic needs destructively, in that the group's psychological and social processes do not address the real problems and, over time, tend to lead to violent actions against others (Staub, 1989a). They also usually lead to the defeat, humiliation, and psychological traumatization of the group that has engaged in violence. Creating hopeful visions of the future that are inclusive, that bring everyone together to address life problems, can help fulfill basic needs constructively (Staub, 1989a, 2003).

Socialization Practices and Experiences That Promote Caring, Helping, Altruism, and Nonaggression

Affection and Nurturance Versus Neglect and Harsh Treatment
Temperamental characteristics of children enter into the development of altruism and aggression (Coie & Dodge, 1998; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). However, impulsiveness, which has been linked to boys' aggression, and other temperamental characteristics that may predispose a child to aggression are both shaped by experience and exert influence in interaction with social experience. Their expressions are shaped by harsh treatment or lack of support from and appropriate guidance by parents and other people. Similarly, temperamental dispositions appear to play a role in the development of empathy in conjunction with early socializing experiences (Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). Surrounding social conditions, like poverty, also play an important role, but they again appear to exert influence primarily by affecting how parents relate to and guide children (McLoyd, 1990). Here I will focus on childrearing practices.

Becoming a caring, helpful, altruistic person, or a hostile, aggressive one, is the result of combinations or patterns of childrearing (Staub, 1979, 1996a, 2003, n.d.-b). Parents responding to their infants' needs and their continuing nurturance, warmth, affection, and sensitivity to their children are the core socializing practices and experiences for the development of helpful tendencies in children (Eisenberg, 1992; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Hoffman, 1970a, 1970b, 1975a;

Shaffer, 1995; Staub, 1971, 1979, 1996a, 1996b, 2003, n.d.-b; Yarrow & Scott, 1972). In contrast, parents neglecting or harshly treating their children—rejection, hostility, the extensive use of physical punishment, and physical or verbal abuse—are the core socializing practices and experiences that contribute to the development of aggression (Coie & Dodge, 1998; Eron, Walder, & Lefkowitz, 1971; Huessman, Eron, Lefkowitz, & Walder, 1984; Huesmann, Lagerspetz, & Eron, 1984; Lykken, 2001; Staub, 1996a, 1996b, 2003, n.d.-b; Weiss, Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1992; Widom, 1989a, 1989b).

Warmth, affection and nurturance mean that adults are responsive to the needs of the child. Responsiveness to the infant's and young child's physical and social needs fulfills the basic needs for security and connection. Parents' sensitive responding to the infant's signals also satisfies the child's need for efficacy and control. Responding to signals and satisfying needs also affirm the child and begin to develop the rudiments of a positive identity. Such sensitive parental responding is associated with the development of secure attachment (Ainsworth, Bell, & Stayton, 1974; Bretherton, 1992; Shaffer, 1995; Thompson, 1998; Waters, Wippman, & Sroufe, 1979). In turn, secure attachment is associated with helping peers when children are 3½ years old (Waters et al., 1979) and with empathy and prosocial behavior in preschool (Kestenbaum, Farber, & Sroufe, 1989).

As children get older, love, affection, and caring about a child's welfare can take varied forms. For example, an essential characteristic of the parents of boys who have high self-esteem appears to be that they care about their children's welfare, which makes the children feel cared about. But this caring is expressed by them in many ways and not necessarily through physical affection (Coopersmith, 1967). Sensitivity in caring about and responding to the child's feelings and needs, to who the child is, will fulfill all basic needs. It will develop connection to important adults, which in turn is a source of positive orientation toward people in general. That this is the case is suggested by research findings that show that securely attached children are also capable of *creating* positive connections. Such children have positive relationship to peers in the early school years (Waters et al., 1979). They are able to create nonaggressive interactions in preschool with children who were found avoidantly attached at a younger age and whose interactions with anxiously attached and other avoidantly attached children are aggressive (Troy & Sroufe, 1987). Furthermore,

unpublished research that I conducted with Don Operario suggests that college students who rate their parents as affectionate and caring also have a positive view of human beings and express concern about and feelings of responsibility for others' welfare. As noted earlier, such a prosocial value orientation is related to varied forms of helping. Warm parenting is also linked to children's empathy.

In contrast, severe negative effects result from neglect and the ineffectiveness of the child's signals (such as crying) to bring about the satisfaction of essential biological (and social) needs. Research has shown that infants in institutions characterized by poor caretaking become depressed and die in significant numbers. Those who survive later show deficiency in their capacity for human connection and in other domains (Shaffer, 1995; Thompson & Grusec, 1970). The conditions in such institutions frustrate infants' basic needs for security, connection, and effectiveness/control. Because of inadequate staffing, infants are fed and cared for on a rigid schedule and when it is their turn, not when they are in need. Their crying brings no response, and they have no significant connection to their caregivers.

Neglect beyond infancy also has extreme negative consequences. Emotional neglect and inattention to the child as a person and to his or her efforts to gain connection and affirmation appear to have at least as severe consequences as harsh treatment (Erickson & Egeland, 1996). Harsh treatment also frustrates basic needs, increasingly so as it becomes more severe and abusive. When it is unpredictable, it creates insecurity. When it is inescapable, it creates a feeling of ineffectiveness. It diminishes the child and breaks connection with important people. It creates a view of people and the world as hostile and dangerous, which interferes with the ability to develop connections to people. Aggressive boys, as well as men, may come to use their aggression as a destructive mode of fulfilling needs for security, efficacy, positive identity, and even connection. They come to interpret others' behavior toward themselves as hostile (Dodge, 1980, 1993) and see aggression as normal, appropriate, and even inevitable (Huessman & Eron, 1984). When boys are victimized and also have aggressive models and people who coach them in aggression—a situation that has been referred to as *violentization*—they may become intensely aggressive (Rhodes, 1999).

Guidance and Discipline Warmth and affection fulfill basic needs

and provide the basis for caring about others' welfare, but they do not develop caring in the child unless accompanied by parental guidance. Parental permissiveness, which is the absence of guidance, has been associated with aggression by adolescents independent of the warmth-hostility dimension (DiLalla, Mitchell, Arthur, & Pagliococca, 1988). Warmth and affection are *not* associated with at least one form of prosocial behavior, generosity, when parents are permissive (Eisenberg, 1992; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Staub, 1979).

Positive guidance itself fulfills basic needs. Guidance provides structure and order in children's lives and makes it easier to gain understanding of the world and develop self-guidance, control, and regulation. By teaching children how to act in order to be successful in their efforts, guidance contributes to the development of a sense of efficacy and positive identity. Parents of high-self-esteem children set high but achievable standards for them (Coopersmith, 1967). Guidance can help children set standards for themselves that make self-reinforcement possible.

Positive guidance uses and further develops the potentials/inclinations developed by the fulfillment of basic needs. In contrast, inherent in harsh treatment is negative guidance—the tendency to use force rather than verbal communication and the modeling of aggression. In such parenting, guidance is not separate from discipline and represents a harsh rather than a moderate form of discipline. The frequent use by parents of their power, in denying or withdrawing privileges, makes the development of caring and helping less likely and of aggression more likely (Coie & Dodge, 1998; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Hoffman, 1970b; Staub, 1996a, 2003, n.d.-b).

Positive guidance consists of adults setting rules for children, but doing so in a democratic manner. Parents can exercise firm control—so that children will act according to important rules—while still being responsive to their children's explaining or reasoning about what they think and want (Baumrind, 1971, 1975). Adults who practice positive guidance also explain reasons for rules. Induction—pointing out to children the consequences of their behavior for others—has been found useful in promoting empathy and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Hoffman, 2000; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). Reasons and explanations, when combined with a positive orientation to other people provided by the fulfillment of basic needs, help children understand others' internal worlds, de-

velop empathy, and feel responsibility to help, and not to harm, others (Staub, 1979). Providing examples of positive behavior toward other people is another important form of guidance, accomplishing similar goals. Through such guidance children learn both the values of caring, empathy, and sympathy and the actions that benefit other people.

When explicit guidance is limited, when rules and explanations that structure and help children understand reality are lacking, then personal experiences, such as interactions that fulfill or frustrate basic needs, and the examples of models become even more powerful. However, explanations that conflict with or are contrary to powerful negative experiences with people—like abuse—will have little positive effect. Verbally guiding children to think about others' needs while they are the objects of abuse or other harmful behaviors is unlikely to be effective. Children who feel uncared for cannot be instructed to care about others. Guidance by the same person that aims to promote caring values, but that is combined with significant levels of harsh treatment, is likely to have limited success in developing caring (see, however, the discussion below of altruism born of suffering). Such behavior represents hypocrisy. Even milder forms of hypocrisy—for example, when an adult tells a child that he should donate a certain number of the rewards that he has won but then herself donates fewer—lead children to ignore the adult's guidance, to not do what the adult said. The children themselves learn hypocrisy. They act as the adult did but give younger children the instructions that the adult gave them (Mischel & Liebert, 1966).

Guidance itself is frequently not explicit, verbal, or even intentional. The reactions of adults to events, which provide information and have affective consequences, can function as guidance. Eisenberg's research shows that parents' facial expressions in response to emotionally arousing film sequences are related to children's regulation of emotion and their sympathetic responsiveness (see Eisenberg, in this volume). Facial expressions and other bodily reactions to members of devalued groups, a parent's grip tightening on the child's hand when they pass by a seedy looking homeless person, an adult's joy or distress, all provide information to and create affective reactions in the child. They tell the child the meaning and affective value of events.

Natural Socialization and Learning by Doing Helping others increases children's later helping behavior (Staub, 1975, 1979, 2003). There is also evidence from research with adults that harming others increases later harmful and aggressive actions (Buss, 1966; Goldstein, Davis, &.Herman, 1975). Children and adults, as well as whole groups of people (Staub, 1989a, 2003), learn by doing. Adults can engage in "natural socialization" (Staub, 1979), giving children meaningful responsibilities to help at home or at school (Grusec, Kuczynski, Rushton, & Simutis, 1978; Whiting & Whiting, 1975), or guiding them to engage in helpful actions in relation to peers, adults, or the community. In contrast, parents who allow violent behavior by children or encourage aggression against peers are likely to promote the development of aggressive tendencies.

Children or adults who harm others and have no negative reactions to or other constraints on their actions are likely to justify what they do by both increasingly devaluing those whom they have harmed and finding good reasons for their actions. This makes new and greater harmdoing possible and probable. At the group level as well, lesser harmdoing against members of another group changes individuals, group norms, and even institutions and furthers the motivation for and allows the development of increasingly harmful actions. Intense violence like genocide evolves in this manner. The actions of witnesses, of "bystanders," in exerting positive influence to halt this evolution, whether in individuals or groups, is crucial (Staub, 1989a, 2003).

The constraints on the development of aggressiveness can sometimes be internal, coming from already developed characteristics of a person. One of my students described in a paper his anger at a "friend" who stole a significant amount of money from him. He beat up this friend, giving him a bad nosebleed. But he was so horrified by his action that he became very nonaggressive. However, when values and emotional orientations like sympathy, which can function as internal controls, have not yet developed, the constraints need to be external.

Children learn to be helpful "by doing" for two reasons. First, their actions fulfill basic needs, and, second, they develop values, beliefs, and skills or extend inclinations already developed through the fulfillment of their basic needs, verbal guidance, and other ways. If the experience of engaging in helpful action has positive cultural

meaning (as is often the case, except in certain subcultures) and leads to others' improved welfare, it fulfills basic needs for positive identity, effectiveness, and positive connection, both to the people helped and to the larger community the values of which the person fulfills. It also expresses and intrinsically affirms the value of helping and, thereby, is especially effective in leading children both to value others' welfare and to see themselves as helpful persons (Eisenberg & Cialdini, 1984; Grusec et al., 1978; Staub, 1979, 2003).

In a series of studies with fifth- and sixth-grade children, my students and I have found (reviewed in Staub, 1979, 2003) that engaging children in helping others tends to increase their later helping. Children who were led to make toys, either for hospitalized children (especially, in the case of girls, when the benefits of their actions were pointed out to them) or in order to help an art teacher prepare materials, tended later to be more helpful. So were children who had opportunities to teach younger children to make puzzles or to use first-aid techniques.

The benefits of these helping experiences vary depending on particular procedures, on the gender of the children, and on the way they are assessed. For example, fifth- and sixth-grade boys writing letters to hospitalized children as a way of helping them show a base rate that is near zero and does not change. But they show the effects of learning by doing on an envelopes test, in which they are asked to gather pictures, poems, and other interesting materials for hospitalized children. When boys made puzzles to help poor hospitalized children, they did not show the effects of puzzle making on an immediate posttest. I interpreted this as the result of "psychological reactance" (Brehm, 1966), a negative reaction by boys to the perception that their freedom was limited by the influence exerted on them to do something "good," to be helpful. However, they did show positive effects on a delayed posttest, 2–3 weeks later, when presumably the reactance had diminished. The effects of teaching younger children were greater when the interaction between the older child, the subject, and the younger child being taught was more positive.

When aggressive actions are not halted by negative consequences, they lead to more aggression because they fulfill basic needs and, as an aspect of that, affirm the actor's strength and power. However, aggression fulfills basic needs destructively. It may create a feeling of effectiveness and control and affirm identity. But it creates

disconnection from the people harmed and, except in violent subcultures, also from the community. It tends to create rejection by others.

Many aggressive youths are unpopular among their peers. However, they are unaware of their unpopularity. This is probably in part because they usually have a few friends similar to themselves, in part because others are afraid to show their dislike, and in part because, owing to their personality, they do not process the cues available to them. But as a result they become increasingly aggressive over time (Zakriski, Jacobs, & Coie 1997).

Peer Socialization of Caring and Altruism versus Aggression

Positive relations between peers have tremendous value in fulfilling basic needs, developing caring values, and helping develop prosocial skills and modes of relating to people. As Piaget has suggested, children learn reciprocity in peer relations. As both Piaget and Kohlberg have emphasized, they learn to take each others' roles. As in their interaction with adults, if they are well treated and also treat others well, they learn to see other people as benevolent and themselves as worthy individuals and effective in positive ways (Staub, 1979). All these are important preconditions for and rudiments of caring about other people and their well-being.

Cross-cultural research has shown that, in all cultures, girls are less aggressive than boys and that girls do substantially more caretaking of younger children than do boys. There is also evidence that boys who do more such caretaking are more prosocial (Whiting & Edwards, 1988), perhaps an example of learning by doing. Caring for younger children requires attention to their needs and is a form of helping—both of the younger child and of the parents.

In contrast, being the recipients of negative behavior from peers is likely to have the opposite effect, leading children to feel insecure and less worthy and to see other people and the world as hostile and dangerous. This may lead to aggression and is likely, at least without healing (see below), to reduce caring for and helping others. Children who are bullied are often deeply affected, in their self-confidence, trust in other people, willingness to initiate relationships, and well-being (Olweus, 1993; Ross & Ross, 1988; Staub, 2003).

Harassment, intimidation, and bullying in schools have negative

effects, not just on the victims, but on everyone. Peers as well as adults in schools are often passive bystanders in the face of such actions, with passivity by peers *increasing* with age (Staub, 2003). Across grade levels, active response by peers to protect a target of bullying is less common than peers joining in the bullying (Staub, 2003). As a result, not only victims, but passive bystanders as well, learn that others are dangerous and that one must be careful in one's relationships with people. To reduce empathic distress, created by witnessing the distress of a victimized peer while remaining passive, children and adolescent are likely to distance themselves psychologically from victims—that is, from people in need (Staub, 1989a). Victims suffer, aggressors are likely to become more aggressive, and passive bystanders are likely to become less empathic. The system in which bullying is frequent contributes to the development of a negative view by children probably not only of other people but also of themselves. All this makes the development of caring and helping less likely.

These conditions indicate that, for the development of caring and helping rather than aggression, it is important to guide children to behave in positive ways toward each other. Adults helping develop positive modes of interaction between siblings in the home and peers in the neighborhood or in school is an essential aspect of positive socialization. Children are much more likely, however, to live by rules that promote positive peer interaction if they have had the positive socialization experiences with adults described earlier.

Children are also much more likely to act positively toward peers if they feel included in the peer group or classroom as a community. Children are harmed, not only by bullying, but also by exclusion—as indicated by other children not interacting with them. Excluded children have even fewer positive feelings about their lives at school than do children who are victimized by peers (Staub, 2003). It is essential, therefore, to find ways to include all children in the community, even those who are academically less skilled or for other reasons tend to be excluded and made marginal either in the classroom community or in other peer-group settings. (On caring schools, and on ways to create positive peer relations in schools, see Staub, 2003.)

Basic Needs and the Evolution of the Self

A number of socialization practices that fulfill basic human needs, and then build on the tendencies thus created to foster affective orientation and values, join together to develop helpful, altruistic tendencies in children. Warmth, affection, and adults sensitively responding to their needs, to their temperament and personality, are crucial. Nurturance must be sensitive to be experienced as such. A parent offering what the child does not need may not be perceived as loving. Positive guidance is also crucial, particularly forms of guidance that promote caring values, sympathy, and the effectiveness/competence that leads to their expression in action. Such guidance includes setting rules, with a dominance of prescriptive rather than proscriptive rules, and the explanation of rules in terms of values, induction, modeling, and natural socialization, which leads to learning by doing. Such modes of relating to the child and guidance will promote self-regulation in affective and other realms. The fulfillment of basic needs is a foundation that, when combined with other elements, promotes caring and helping.

Evolution in the psychological and social sense, both of children's personality and of the environment that surrounds them (the social world), is a core process in the development of caring, helping, and altruism. A different evolution leads to aggression. In part, these forms of evolution are simply outcomes of the processes already noted, such as the fulfillment or frustration of basic needs and guiding children by words and examples, combined with opportunities and encouragement to help others. The psychological changes in the course of the evolution involve increasing concern about those helped and the extension of that concern to people beyond one's group (or increasing devaluation of those harmed and the extension of that devaluation to more people) and a view of oneself as helpful (or as willing to use aggression).

An important aspect of this evolution may be the construction of people's basic needs. With experience, needs are likely to be shaped and formed, to become cognitive/emotional constructions, which then limit or expand in varied ways how needs can be fulfilled. Since aggressive men (Toch, 1969) come to see toughness and strength as masculine ideals, they have to be tough and strong to fulfill their need for a positive identity. The tendency to feel empathy and concern for

people (except perhaps some intimates) will not fulfill their need for a positive identity. An increase in empathy will not be a desirable "expansion of the self," which I see as an aspect of the fulfillment of the need for a positive identity.

When a child devalues another child, when a group of peers or an ethnic or religious group devalues another group, it becomes unlikely that individuals can and will fulfill their need for connection by friendship with the devalued person or with members of the devalued group. Perpetrators learn to deal with consequences of their actions by closing themselves off to the feelings of their victims, by learning to become less empathic (Staub, 1989a; Staub & Pearlman, 2001; Staub, Pearlman, & Miller, 2003). Over time, their capacity to form connections to people in general may diminish. In the course of the evolution of helping and aggression, the cognitive/emotional construction of basic needs is likely to evolve in ways that contribute to further evolution in the same direction. Individuals—both children and adults—progressively engage in self-socialization, which can take the form of actions that bring forth reactions or of the selection of associates, peers, and environments, both of which further shape the direction in which they have been developing.

The Development of Inclusive Caring

Even among people who have learned to care about others' welfare, caring can be limited to people in their own group. There is a human tendency to differentiate between "us" and "them" and to devalue "them," a tendency rooted in, among other things, the cognitive process of categorization (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and differences in reactions to the familiar and the unfamiliar (Staub, 1989a). Some groups, especially when they are the victims of discrimination and violence, can be devalued to such an extent that they are excluded from the moral realm (Opotaw, 1990; Staub, 1989a). People do not see them as deserving moral consideration and do not feel empathy and caring for them. To create a nonviolent, caring world, to create goodness, extending the boundaries of "us" is essential. Inclusive caring, the extension of caring to the "other," ideally to all human beings, develops through words and images that humanize all people, through the example of models who show caring for people regardless of their

group membership, and through one's own experience of connection to varied people (Staub, 2002a, 2002b).

Many "rescuers"—Christians in Nazi Europe who endangered themselves and often their families as well by attempting to save the lives of Jews—had been raised in families that promoted inclusive caring. They were socialized in a way that was highly consistent with the socialization process described above as important in developing altruism. They received more love and affection and positive guidance than did others who were in similar situations but did not help. They had parents who, in cultures where physical punishment was common, used explanation instead. They were exposed to helpful models, often parents who embodied moral values in their actions. They had parents who engaged more in interaction with, and maintained positive social relations with, people outside their own group, including Jews. They heard their parents make fewer negative statements, if any, about Jews—a group devalued in Germany and in other European countries occupied by or under the influence of Nazi Germany where the Holocaust was perpetrated—than did comparison subjects who were in a position to help out but did not do so (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). It seems from this retrospective research that the socialization that the rescuers had experienced was then elaborated and further developed by their later experience in ways that promoted inclusive caring in relation to people who were devalued and later endangered.

Experiences of significant connection to people who are outside one's group and who are devalued are important in developing inclusive caring. Social psychologists have long hypothesized that contact between members of different groups helps overcome devaluation, prejudice, and hostility (see, among many others, Allport, 1954; Deutsch, 1973; Pettigrew, 1997, 1998; and Staub, 1989a). A recent meta-analysis of a very large number of studies confirms that this is so (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Even though the experience of interaction and engagement was limited in many of the studies, it reduced negative attitudes toward members of another group.

The deeper the contact, and the more it involves shared goals that people work for, the greater the likely benefit. One method of creating such contact in schools has been through cooperative-learning methods. Specifically, in one procedure, six children who are members of different groups—white and minority children—work together. To

accomplish their task each must learn some material and teach it to the others (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney, & Snapp, 1978). In the course of being both teachers and learners, children are drawn into significant engagement with each other. Such cooperative-learning procedures have led to more positive interaction between white and minority children and improved the academic performance of minority children (see Staub, 2002a, 2002b, 2003).

Learning by doing can also be an avenue to inclusive caring. In the case of aggression by groups toward other groups, the range of victims usually expands. In the case of helping others, the commitment to those who are helped usually deepens, and the range of those who are helped may expand. Rescuers who have initially agreed to help a particular person in a limited way become more engaged and help more. They may have initially agreed to hide some people for a few days but ended up hiding them for years. Or, if they had succeeded in moving some people to a safer place, they then initiated helping others (Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Staub, 1989a). Rescuers who agreed to help a Jew who was a former friend or associate often decided to help others who were strangers.

Concern can also expand from one group to other groups and to all humanity. At the time of the disappearances in Argentina, the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo demonstrated, marching every day in the centrally located Plaza del Mayo in Buenos Aires. In spite of intimidation, harassment, and even abduction, they continued to protest the disappearance of their children. But over time their concern expanded, to include other disappeared people as well as people who were persecuted and victimized outside Argentina (Ehlstein, 1986).

Culture and education can promote inclusive caring for all human beings, regardless of group membership. This can be done by humanizing—describing in not devaluative but respectful, caring ways—every group (Staub et al., in press; Staub et al., 2003). It can also be done by eliminating discrimination, which expresses and promotes devaluation. It can be done by creating social systems in which people belonging to different groups have equal rights, whether in the classroom or in other settings in society, thereby fostering positive relations characterized by mutual respect (Staub, 2003).

The Development of Moral Courage

Moral courage is of great importance for a nonviolent, caring world. The term *moral courage* refers to the courage to express important values in words and actions, even in the face of opposition, potential disapproval, and ostracism or a violent response. Moral courage may require physical courage, but often it requires only what may be called *psychological courage*.

Is courage in behalf of any kind of belief or value a moral courage? In the perspective that I am proposing, the courage required to act in the face of opposition is moral only if the beliefs or values (including affective reactions like empathy) that motivate it involve protecting or promoting human welfare. For example, young men who joined and persisted in supporting the Nazi movement or joined the sa, the stormtroopers of the Nazi movement, during the 1920s, well before Hitler came to power, often faced opposition from and disapproval by members of the community (Merkl, 1980). So might members of violent gangs and violent ideological movements, including terrorists. Their actions in opposition to these constraining forces do not constitute moral courage.

Identifying courage as moral only if the values and beliefs involved are moral makes it a more difficult matter to judge when people express moral courage. When harmful actions are ideologically motivated, the perpetrators often claim, and probably often believe, that their beliefs and values are moral and that their actions are for the good of their group or of all human beings. Often they believe that they are acting for a higher morality (Staub, 1989a, 2003). To determine whether their actions, the actions of actors in general, are moral requires an "external" judgment. This judgment may be based on the combination of information available about the actors' beliefs and intentions, the form of the actions themselves (do they appear to be actions that would create benefit, harm, or neither?), the potential or actual consequences of the actions, and the preceding conditions that gave rise to them.

It is more difficult to be morally courageous when acting alone than when acting in a group, for example, a child acting to stop the bullying of another child. Members of movements—whether acting in a moral or in an immoral cause—get support and encouragement from other members, who have become their primary reference

group. Speaking out within a group or movement against harmful action by the group requires special moral courage.

The importance of support from like-minded others can be found in many instances. For example, even when abolitionists in the United States were acting alone, facing hostile groups while advocating the abolition of slavery, they were supported by their feelings of connection to other abolitionists (Tompkins, 1965). People may also find support from internalized, imagined others—and the ideals that those others set for them.

The Socialization of Moral Courage What might be the roots of moral courage in children's experience? Some of the socialization experiences described above as involved in the development of moral and caring emotions and values also play an important role in the development of moral courage. For example, the parents of many young civil rights activists in the United States who went to the South in the 1960s to advance desegregation by participating in marches and sit-ins modeled moral concern, engagement, and courage. They demonstrated against injustice and for justice. Some of the fathers fought in the Spanish Civil War. The combined influence of varied experiences is shown in that young activists who had both such moral parental models and unconflicted positive relations with their parents were more committed to, more persistent in their civil rights activities than were those who had moral parents toward whom they felt ambivalence (Rosenhan, 1970).

Providing children with opportunities and encouraging them to express their thoughts, beliefs, and values can be important. Baumrind (1971, 1975) has reported that authoritative parents tended to listen to their children's arguments about what they wanted to do, even if what the children wanted was contrary to some rule or to what they had originally been asked to do, and that they sometimes yielded. (However, they would not yield to whining or demanding.) This is likely to encourage children to express themselves.

Teachers in schools may have students participate in making rules for the classroom. This can provide a context in which students learn to engage in discussion, to speak out, and to become comfortable with expressing views that are not necessarily accepted by others (see Staub, 2003, chaps. 15, 20; Staub, n.d.-b). Parents can do the same in the home. This way children can learn to trust their voice

and its potential influence. This is especially difficult to bring about, but especially important, in societies where children are taught not to question or challenge authority and where they do not normally develop their own perspective and voice. When parents, teachers, and other adults encourage students to be "active bystanders" when they witness harmful actions toward individuals, when they affirm their speaking out against cruelty or injustice or simply their expressing beliefs or points of view that are contrary to those of others (not necessarily agreeing with the content, but simply affirming the expression of their views), they can help develop moral courage.

The Relationship Between the Self and the Group Teaching children to think not in terms of abstractions and absolutes but in terms of concrete human welfare is also important. An example of this might be the distinction between *blind* and *constructive* patriotism. Blind patriots support their country and its actions unconditionally. Constructive patriots express about the same degree of love for their country as blind patriots. However, they believe that their love of their country requires them to speak out against policies and practices that are contrary to important human values as well as against policies and practices that they see as contrary to the essential values of their country (Staub, 1997). Constructive patriots score higher on prosocial value orientation, are more willing to criticize their country, and report that they spend more time gathering political information and are more politically active (Schatz et al., 1999).

The types of selves that children develop may be important for moral courage. Psychologists have long been interested in the differences between collectivist and individualist cultures (Triandis, 1994). A number of psychologists, inspired by differences found between those two types of cultures in the construction of identity, have proposed that there are differences within Western, individualist cultures in the identities that women and men develop. While terminologies have differed, some have proposed that women have more relational selves, men more autonomous selves (Sampson, 1988; Surrey, 1985).

I have suggested a further differentiation among relational selves. While the connections to others and the orientation to community that collectivist cultures generate have great benefits, they can also pose problems. Individuals may have difficulty separating

themselves from their group and, when important from the moral/ caring standpoint discussed here, opposing their group. Individuals with what I have called *embedded selves*, which embody both feelings of connection and strong dependence, will have difficulty separating themselves from and opposing others, whether individuals or the group as a whole. In contrast, individuals with *connected selves*, which embody feelings of connection to other individuals and/or the group but also sufficient independence to stand alone if necessary, will be more likely to take morally courageous actions (Staub, 1993). What seems important for the development of the latter kind of self, in addition to what I have already discussed in the context of the development of "goodness" and moral courage, is granting children appropriate autonomy. That is, while guidance and what Baumrind (1971, 1975) has called *firm control* have great value, it is also important to allow children, in the context of adherence to essential rules, values, and principles, the maximum autonomy that is appropriate for their age (Staub, n.d.-b).

Not being embedded in a group makes an independent perspective possible. A fair percentage of rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust were in some way marginal to their communities (Tec, 1986). Marginality was often a function of their social situation, for example, having a foreign-born parent or having a different religion—a Catholic in a Protestant community. But it could also be a function of their personality, the nature of their identity, a history of being "different." Their marginality may have enabled them to separate themselves from their communities, which often supported the persecution of Jews, and thereby maintain an independent perspective. Constructive patriots in contrast to blind patriots also seem to have a separate-enough perspective to question the problematic policies and practices of their group.

A "critical consciousness" seems crucial (Staub, 1989a). In order to act on one's values, it is necessary to realize the relevance of those values to particular events or policies and practices in a group. This often entails using one's own judgment about the meaning of events, rather than accepting the meaning that others explicitly or implicitly communicate about them. For example, there was much public discussion in the United States preceding the beginning of the war against Iraq in 2003 about the connection between Iraq and the September 11 attacks. The Bush administration asserted that such

a connection existed. However, CIA reports and all other sources, including discussion in the media, have indicated the absence of evidence for it. Still, polls showed that over 50% of the American public believed that Iraq was involved in the attacks, a seeming lack of a critical consciousness. (The woundedness and insecurity that resulted from the attacks may have created both a strong need to know where the violence originated and an increased reliance on the words of leaders.) Some of the practices already discussed as important for the development of moral courage are also likely to help in the development of critical consciousness.

We must learn more about the origins of moral courage and create conditions that help such courage develop. Morally courageous people who are active bystanders can make a crucial difference, in many settings, at important moments, as individuals or as members of groups opposing harmful or violent social policies and practices or promoting helpful ones. Morally courageous actions can be important at particular times, in response to specific events. But, beyond that, morally committed and courageous people can join to overcome the inertia of social systems, activate other bystanders, and work on creating societies and an international community that promote harmony and caring in human relations (Staub, 2003).

Trauma and Healing, Resilience, Need Fulfillment, and Altruism Born of Suffering

Research on the development of caring, helping, and altruism in children has focused on positive roots, as described so far in this chapter. However, observation and many self-reports and case studies indicate that people who have suffered from victimization and other trauma often come to devote themselves to helping others. My attention first focused on this when I prepared a questionnaire assessing prosocial value orientation and helping for *Psychology Today* (Staub, 1989b; see also Staub 2003) that over 7,000 readers filled out and returned. Many of them, in response to my request, also wrote letters with additional information about themselves. Several of those who wrote reported that their own suffering, early in their lives, led them to help others, especially to try to prevent such suffering by other people.

Research and clinical observation has focused on the traumatic

effects of victimization and suffering (Herman, 1992; McCann & Pearlman, 1990). It has also been shown that bad treatment, neglect, and abuse, both physical and verbal, contribute to aggression in children. Some of this research was described earlier. Other research has shown that people who were abused as children are more likely to abuse their own children (Kaufman & Zigler, 1987) and that, among violent criminals, the great majority had experiences of victimization at home or in their community (Gilligan, 1996; Rhodes, 1999; Widom, 1989a, 1989b). According to newspaper reports, at least, many of the school shooters were victimized by peers.

People who have been the object of violence at the hands of others, whether those others acted as individuals or as members of a group, are likely to feel diminished. They will tend to feel that something must be wrong with them, that they must somehow have deserved to be treated that way. They will tend to see the world as dangerous and feel vulnerable. They will be more likely to see, therefore, threat, danger, and potential attack and feel the need to defend themselves, even when there is no real threat (Staub, 1998, 2003; Staub & Pearlman, 2001).

However, not everyone who is victimized becomes aggressive. Many children who come from difficult backgrounds show resilience—effective functioning in spite of their background (Butler, 1997; Masten, 2001; Rutter, 1987; Staub, n.d.-b; Werner, 1987; Werner & Smith, 1992). And some people who have greatly suffered as children become caring and helpful people who devote themselves to the welfare of others. O'Connell Higgins (1994) described adults severely abused as children, some mercilessly beaten by parents, who have become deeply caring people, devoting their lives to helping people in need or to protecting people from suffering the way they themselves have suffered. Valent (1998) noted that many child survivors of the Holocaust are in service professions or work for positive social change.

Some people who have experienced great suffering and the frustration of basic needs that this entails—the need for security, for effectiveness and control, for a positive identity, for a positive connection, and for comprehension of reality—may lack corrective, transformative experiences. They may even have developed such an intensely defensive stance against a hostile world, or an intensely hostile stance, that they cannot use opportunities to ameliorate their

hostile orientations. They may not be able to perceive or use opportunities for significant, caring human connections or other healing experiences. However, other people who have been victimized may both have opportunity for and make use of corrective experiences.

I assume that, if they are to become caring, altruistic people, victimized children require that their basic needs be fulfilled, to some degree at least, either before or after their victimization, or both, and that the psychological wounds created by their victimization heal to some degree. Prior need fulfillment may protect them to some extent from the effects of victimization. For example, one of the protective elements for children who come from difficult environments and are resilient seems to be early secure attachment to a caretaker (Werner & Smith, 1992). Subsequent need fulfillment may enable them to see hopeful possibilities in life, the possibility of security, of dignity, and of positive, loving connections between people.

Healing from past trauma requires gaining renewed trust in people. Connection to caring people, adults as well as children, is especially important in this. Resilience in children is usually facilitated by interest and support from and positive connection to one or more persons—teachers, counselors, relatives, neighbors (Butler, 1997; Werner & Smith, 1992). Temperament also contributes to resilience (Rutter, 1987). It may be the case, in part at least, that children who are more outgoing make active efforts to connect with potentially supporting others.

Healing, in part through positive connections to people and the fulfillment of basic needs, enables people who have suffered to become open to the pain of others. This openness to others, combined with a more caring world that they may now be able to envision, may, given their own experiences, lead them to strong feelings of empathy and sympathy and even to a feeling of responsibility to help those in need. Identification with those who suffer may lead to increasing engagement and the development of the intense motivation to help others that some of these altruists describe.

Connection to other children can also help wounded children heal. Freud and Dann (1951) described a group of young children who survived Auschwitz together. Taken to England afterward, they were extremely resistant to adults but fiercely loyal to and supportive of each other. According to Freud and Dann, their deep connections to each other enabled them to begin, over time, to develop connec-

tions to adults. Suomi and Harlow (1972) found that monkeys isolated in the first 6 months of their lives were highly inappropriate in their social and sexual interactions with their peers. The only treatment that was reasonably effective was pairing them with normal infant monkeys, who would cling to them. The former isolates would carry these infant monkeys around. Presumably, this helped them change both in the kind of emotions that they experienced and in emotional self-regulation. As the growing infants began to develop social skills, the isolates would learn along with them. Research with children has shown that socially ineffective children's social interactions improved after they spent time supervising/interacting with younger children (Furman, Rahe, & Hartup, 1979).

In the case of survivors of genocide, many of them had their basic needs fulfilled through close, loving connections to their families and their group before the genocide and to other survivors afterward. In addition, many survivors were helped by other people. Many also engaged in courageous action to help themselves. This was true of survivors of the Holocaust: even young children often engaged in amazing acts of initiative to help themselves or their families (Staub, n.d.-a). Such experiences fulfill, in the midst of horrible circumstances, needs for connection, effectiveness, and identity and a comprehension of reality that provides hope and makes caring for others possible.

Some of these considerations about the roots of altruism born of suffering are supported by case histories provided by my students. In the course of teaching, I have over the past 10–15 years come to guide students to write papers in which they apply psychological research and theory to their own experiences, to an exploration of the connection between their life experiences and the people they have become.

One of my students, a bright, attractive young woman, had a terrible year in the eighth grade. There was a boys' clique that dictated the rules by which the girls were to behave. In addition to sexual teasing, they would touch the girls—their breasts, their buttocks. They engaged in many degrading actions, which most of the girls endured, and which some even acted as if they welcomed. Because she did not go along with this, my student was viciously teased and ostracized, not only by the boys, but by the girls as well. The teachers witnessed all this but did nothing, even making comments to her

like, "Boys will be boys." She suffered all this without yielding, but suffered greatly.

In her home life, however, she had received a great deal of love and affection before this and much love and support while this was happening. She also saw her parents as moral, spiritual people, instilling in her both an understanding of others (she came to interpret the behavior of the boy who was the main gang leader as a child of busy socialites who paid little attention to him) and a sense of independence. She believes that it was the combination of her suffering that year and her background and the support that she received that led her to engage in her many and varied activities to help others: volunteering with mentally and physically disabled children; spending time helping rebuild a town in a poor area of the country after a disaster; serving as a peer mention, as a tutor, and as a counselor for emotionally disturbed girls; volunteering at many charities and organizations; being the kind of person to whom others turn for consolation; and more. An interesting aspect of this situation, perhaps having to do with moral courage, perhaps with concern for their daughter, is that, while the parents were highly supportive of her, they were passive in relation to the school, not taking action to stop the bullying.

Another student described a great deal of criticism by her parents, which made her feel diminished and helpless. Perhaps because of this she dropped out of and reentered college several times. One of these times a teacher in a community college showed special interest and caring, not just for my student, but for all her students. My student was able to experience and was deeply affected by her caring and benevolence and by her trust in her ability. Later she worked as an intern in a school with mentally less developed children. Being distressed by the way the teachers treated the children, she was both strongly motivated and able to engage in what she felt were supportive and helpful interactions with the children. She felt that both these experiences, the benevolence of her teacher and her own helpful actions, gave her hope and strength and led her to go on to a four-year college and do well there.

Positive connections to and support by other people are important to the healing of victimized children and adults and to the fulfillment of previously deeply frustrated basic needs. They affirm the self, fulfill the need for connection, and offer a more hopeful view of

the world. However, other processes of healing are also important. One of these is engagement with painful experiences, in combination with empathy and support from other people. This helps a person realize that the past is not the present and see the present as safe and more hopeful. With children this may be facilitated by reading and discussing literature that is relevant to their difficult and painful experiences (Staub, 2003). Such indirect engagement may be safer but still helpful nonetheless. Writing about personal experiences may also be helpful, as it has been found to be in research with college students (Pennebacker & Beall, 1986). If done under the right supportive conditions, talking about personal experiences can be highly beneficial for children. Parents who have divorced have reported to me, for example, that their children gained self-confidence and reassurance from participating in school in group discussions with other children whose parents have divorced.

Another avenue to healing from victimization is understanding how the perpetrators came to do what they did. In Rwanda, discussing with people how genocide comes about (Staub & Pearlman, 2001; Staub et al., in press; Staub et al., 2003; on the origins of genocide, see also Staub, 1989a), with examples of other instances of genocide, seemed to have highly beneficial effects. Coming to see genocide as an understandable even if a tragic and horrible human process, rather than incomprehensible evil, seemed to help both survivors and bystanders feel more "human," rather than outcasts from the human fold. (While members of both groups, Tutsis and Hutus, participated, perpetrators were not included.) In addition, during the course of the discussion people realized that, if they understood how it happened, they could take action to prevent it from happening again (Staub & Pearlman, 2001; Staub et al., in press; Staub et al., 2003). A formal evaluation of an intervention in which the exploration of the roots of genocide was one of several components showed reduction in trauma symptoms and a more positive orientation by members of the groups involved toward each other (Staub, 2003; Staub et al., in press).

In her case histories of resilient adults, O'Connell Higgins (1994) also reports that understanding can be useful. In one of the chapters we learn about Dan, who was an object of his father's rage and frequently and severely beaten by him. He was also given enemas by his mother to make him a better child. Later he found that under-

standing the source of his parents' behavior—for example, seeing in his mind's eye his father, who was severely neglected by his parents, stand in his crib screaming and shaking it, with nobody responding, this giving rise to his rage—helped him to some degree accept who his father was. Dan himself has become a successful person whose work involves helping others, in efficient and effective ways.

There is substantial evidence that altruism born of suffering is a real and important phenomenon. While I have suggested here some of the experiences that are likely to contribute to its evolution, both the extent to which people who have suffered victimization and other traumas become altruists and the conditions required for this to happen ought to be a focus of concentrated study.

Conclusions: Optimal Human Functioning and the Good Society

In conclusion, I want to stress two important matters. First, the fulfillment of basic human needs is not just an individual matter, that is, a matter of the circumstances of a particular person, but to a great extent a cultural/societal matter. Second, the fulfillment of these needs contributes, not only to goodness, but also to individuals' continued development or growth, to their fulfillment of their human and personal potentials—to what may be called *optimal human functioning* (Staub, 2003).

Starting with the second issue, I have suggested that an important avenue to goodness is through the constructive fulfillment of basic needs, in combination with guidance that develops sympathetic emotions and caring values. However, as basic needs are fulfilled, they also provide the base for continued personal growth. They undergo transformation, become less pressing, and evolve into personal goals (Staub, 1980), the desire to bring about particular valued outcomes. The outcomes that people value will differ, depending on their life experiences. Realms of effectiveness, sources of positive identity, the importance of connections to individuals or a larger community, may all vary.

While people whose needs have been fulfilled will differ, they are likely to have in common an openness to experience (since they perceive other people and the world as reasonably benevolent), a capacity for processing their experience and self-awareness (since,

given their positive identity and feelings of effectiveness and control, they do not need to protect themselves because of who they are or what they think and feel), as well as other important characteristics that contribute to continued personal growth (Maslow, 1987). Given a sense of effectiveness in the work realm, they will be open to new knowledge and creative endeavors. They are, thus, likely to continue to develop both in the personal and in the work realms. According to the conception of personal goals with which I have been working (Staub, 1989a, 1996b, 1999b, 2003), when other needs are fulfilled, the need for transcendence, to go beyond the self, emerges or becomes more dominant. Thus, people whose basic needs have been constructively fulfilled are able to focus less on themselves and more on other people, the world, and spiritual matters.

What might be the relation between altruism born of suffering and optimal human functioning? It is possible that, even though people who have suffered and whose basic needs have been frustrated can become true altruists under certain conditions, their continued personal growth and evolution will be hindered and made more difficult by the painful experiences that they have had. It is also possible, however, that their caring and altruistic orientation becomes for them an avenue to continued personal growth (Colby & Damon, 1992; O'Connell Higgins, 1994).

With regard to the first issue, the actions of members of families, adults in schools, and peers fulfill or frustrate basic needs. However, families, schools, and peers are located in a society. How they act is affected by the characteristics of that society: beliefs about how children are to be treated; the devaluation of and discrimination against members of particular groups; and so on. Poverty, which varies by society and subgroups in it, creates stress and negatively affects parenting (McLoyd, 1990), frustrating children's needs. Teenage single mothers, especially if they are poor, are likely to have their own needs frustrated by their circumstances and to have difficulty fulfilling the needs of their children. Unless they receive support from others, they are much more likely to abuse their children than are other mothers (Garcia-Coll, Hoffman, & Oh, 1987). When a society helps its members fulfill basic needs constructively, there is likely to be more belief in enlightened self-interest and more generalized reciprocity in people helping each other. It would make great sense to evaluate the goodness of societies in terms of the ease or difficulty of fulfilling

basic human needs and to identify desirable social changes in terms of their probable contribution to the fulfillment of basic needs (Staub, 2003).

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